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Introduction by  
Richard B. Miller 
Director, Poynter Center for the Study of 
Ethics and American Institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Over the course of the 2004-05 
academic year, six faculty from IU 
Bloomington met ten times to read and 
discuss materials on “The Ethics and Politics 
of Childhood,” the theme for the second 
annual Poynter Center Interdisciplinary 
Faculty Fellowship and Seminar. 
    
Drawing on moral philosophy, cultural 
studies, political theory, legal decisions, and 
American literature, the seminar set out to 
explore a series of questions surrounding 
children and our responsibilities toward 
them. If there is any one universal 
experience, it is that we were all young 
once. Yet our experiences of youth and the 
moral issues surrounding our relationships 
with parents, cultural, religious and 
educational authorities, and the state remain 
relatively unexplored. Our seminar thus tried 
to sort out questions regarding the nature 
and grounding of children’s rights, the 
duties of love and justice toward children, 
claims that cultural, political, and religious 
groups may make on behalf of a child’s 
welfare, and the moral basis of the family, 
among other topics. We looked at debates 
about the role of public education in the 
civic and moral formation of children; the 
rise of the home schooling movement; issues 
regarding the gestation, design, and rearing 
of children; and the grounds and limits of 
parental authority. All of these topics spark 
reflection about, and enlist theoretical help 
from, more general claims regarding human 
freedom, the relationship between families 
and the state, and the claims of identity and 
cultural background in childhood 
development.   
 
The essay by Aviva Orenstein that 
follows grows out of the seminar’s year-long 
interaction. Professor Orenstein was one of 
the fellows. My aim here is to provide a 
preface to Professor Orenstein’s paper that 
summarizes some of the seminar’s 
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reflections and discussions over the course 
of the 2004-05 year. 
   
First, a word about the topic: My 
rationale for choosing this topic was that 
little sustained work has addressed adults’ 
moral responsibilities toward children or 
children’s responsibilities toward 
themselves and others. That lacuna is 
striking given the universality of childhood 
experience and the importance of relating to 
children in families, schools, and civil 
society. Children seem strangely “orphaned” 
by intellectuals. Creating a bibliography that 
captures features of childhood experience 
along with their moral and political 
dimensions was one of our aims.  
 
 We organized our initial set of readings 
in a series of concentric circles. (For a copy 
of our syllabus, please consult our website at 
http://poynter.indiana.edu/fellows04.shtml#
Readings.) We began with an effort to think 
about childhood experience and to consider 
differences between a child’s and an adult’s 
experience of the world. We thus asked 
whether childhood is a stage or a state, 
whether it should be seen as a condition of 
innocence or diabolical adventure, and how 
we might consider questions of dependence 
and independence of children as they grow.   
 
We then asked how we might theorize 
about children’s rights in light of inferences 
we drew from accounts of childhood 
experience. If there is something special 
about childhood either as a stage or a state, 
then perhaps there is something unusual 
about the sorts of rights we might attach to 
children. We discussed at length the idea 
from Joel Feinberg that children have a right 
to an “open future”— a right held in trust 
now for certain protections and entitlements 
that a child is due later, as an adult. The 
right to an open future refers to rights that 
are saved for young persons until they reach 
adulthood, but which can be violated 
prematurely, before a young person is able 
to claim or use them. We also asked whether 
the language of rights is the best way to 
frame adults’ responsibilities toward 
children, especially if we view such 
responsibilities as involving family ties that 
are of an unusually intimate sort.   
 
Such questions have moral and legal 
dimensions. On the moral side, we asked 
how a right to an open future connects, if at 
all, to many parents’ desires to provide “the 
best” for their children. How does the quest 
for “better children” stack up to the 
affirmation of a right to an open future? Are 
there limits to demands that many parents 
pursue in the training and medical treatment 
of their children? Is the pursuit of better 
children aiming to help them exercise that 
right, or does it suggest narrowing the 
options for a child? We thus asked how 
“open” an “open future” can be. On the legal 
side, we examined the extent to which such 
a right empowers the state to intrude into 
family matters, and whether such intrusions 
constitute an unusual sort of infringement.  
This is an especially sensitive matter given 
the privacy we attach to families as a 
condition for respecting the liberty of 
individuals and the value of family intimacy.    
 
Questions surrounding a child’s 
experience of intimacy in family life lead 
naturally into questions about the moral 
basis of the family and whether it constitutes 
a unique kind of social unit. Here the 
question was not whether the family 
contributes something valuable to the state, 
but whether there are intrinsic goods to the 
family. What legitimizes the family as a 
social entity, as opposed to cults, clubs, 
friendships, political parties, and other social 
groups? Are there moral goods intrinsic to 
the family that allows us to assign a specific 
sphere to it as a social unit? That is to say, is 
there something about the nature of the 
family that provides a basis for morally 
evaluating actual family arrangements and 
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relationships? In a related vein, we might 
ask if there are moral reasons for having 
children.   
 
One way to approach these matters is to 
say, following Ferdinand Shoeman, that 
adults have the right to enter into certain 
kinds of special relationships. We esteem 
families, in other words, because they 
provide the locus for forming unique kinds 
of connections, connections that are 
unavailable to us in other social contexts.  
Yet esteeming families because they enable 
adults to satisfy a basic set of rights seems 
strange, or at least limited. It appears to 
ignore the goods that children experience in 
families independent of whether their 
parents are satisfying a set of rights-claims.  
Given that fact, we were led to ask about 
other goods or values are that are relevant to 
the intrinsic goodness of the family.   
  
Guidance on this basic question might 
be provided by the principles of love and 
justice. On the one hand, the idea of a “right 
to enter into certain kinds of special 
relationships” suggests that we look at 
justice as providing a basis for thinking 
about the moral basis for the family. Justice 
provides a critical principle, although 
perhaps a limited one, for evaluating 
parental decisions and family life more 
generally. At a minimum, it protects against 
families becoming small despotisms.   
  
But many of us also experience family 
love as unconditionally accepting.  
Moreover, within families we experience 
mutual flourishing, intimacy, and 
meaningful experiences as part of the 
inherent goods of family life. Those facts 
seem not to sit comfortably with the idea of 
“family justice.” It seems odd to say that 
love should be the subject of a “claim.” 
Thus the seminar asked if family love 
presupposes justice as a primary virtue, or 
whether family love qualifies or modifies 
the application of justice. That is to say, 
should justice constrain love, and if so, does 
that endanger it? Or is it the case that family 
justice ought to be qualified, perhaps 
tempered, by love?   
 
Families, of course, do not exist in a 
cultural, political, or social vacuum. They 
are prime “carriers” of customs and 
traditions. Thus the seminar focused on the 
relationship between children, families, and 
cultural traditions. One question is whether 
there is something special about culture that 
marks it off as a unique kind of good. Often 
we connect considerations of culture with 
the good of identity formation. But basic 
questions about how to triangulate the 
values attached to cultures, families, and a 
respect for children are nettlesome.   
 
For example, we might ask whether 
children are entitled to being enculturated by 
their parents and, if so, whether any set of 
cultural traditions will do. Put differently, it 
is an open question whether parents have the 
duty to bestow their cultural beliefs on their 
children. If they do have such a duty, then 
parents commit some kind of wrong by not 
socializing their children within a particular 
culture, or by not passing along their cultural 
traditions (if they have them). Rarely, 
however, do we in fact censure parents for 
failing to transmit cultural traditions that 
they don’t endorse.   
 
A related set of issues turns on whether 
parents have a right to enculturate their 
children. If they do, then we might ask 
whether this right is any different from the 
sort of rights we generally assign to parents 
by virtue of their authority in the family.  
We might also ask if there are restrictions on 
this right. Naturally such a right is likely 
bump up against the rights that we 
considered at the outset of the seminar. If 
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children have rights, then those rights may 
limit what parents can do in the name of 
transmitting cultural values. We examined 
these questions in light of important legal 
decisions, including Yoder v. Wisconsin.   
   
Encircling the child, his or her parents 
and family, and the family’s cultural and 
religious traditions, is the state. Given the 
assumption that the state has an interest in 
forming citizens and that citizenship 
involves a certain set of virtues and 
dispositions, we were led to ask how to 
integrate the role of the state into 
considerations of cultural transmission and 
moral formation. Of special relevance is the 
role of educational institutions in such 
matters. The state’s interest in forming 
citizens must, of course, be situated in 
relation to parents’ interests in the kind of 
child they want to raise, and the interests 
that children may have independently of 
family, cultural, or state interests. There is 
also the delicate issue of the extent to which 
the state in a liberal democracy can presume 
to transmit moral values that seem to extend 
beyond those of a civic sort.   
 
Attention to educational matters also 
leads naturally to considerations of the sort 
of “reason” that should be cultivated in 
schools. Sometimes such reason chafes 
against the traditions, cultural norms, or 
belief systems of families. The seminar thus 
considered questions of “public 
reasonableness” civic virtue, and the skills 
of democratic participation as necessary 
ingredients in the civic formation of 
children.   
 
The seminar participants used our 
discussions as a platform for launching a 
series of independent research projects.  
These projects took up questions regarding 
the practical and moral challenges of 
working with divorced parents in legal 
contexts, rights to health care, research on 
children in educational settings, and the 
home schooling movement.   
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Introduction 
 
This paper considers the question of 
child custody in light of children’s rights.  
After presenting background on child 
custody disputes, it employs Joel Feinberg’s 
notion of a right to an open future and Sigal 
Benporath’s emphasis on valuing childhood 
to explore how the state should determine 
custody in contested cases, and what role, if 
any, the desires of the child should play in 
the resolution of such cases. This paper 
focuses on the role of the Guardian Ad 
Litem (GAL), who conducts investigations 
and advises family court judges. It 
concludes that children must be respected 
but cannot dictate custody issues, despite 
their intense interest in the outcome. It 
criticizes the intense adversarial atmosphere 
in which custody decisions are made, even 
by supposedly non-adversarial Guardians 
Ad Litem charged with representing the best 
interests of the child. This paper argues that 
it is nonsensical to think of children’s 
interests in a vacuum and that the GAL must 
consider the interests of the family as a 
whole. Although the focus is on the role of 
the GAL, the analysis has important 
implications for the behavior of judges, 
attorneys, and parents as well.   
 
The Fight for Child Custody in American 
Courts 
 
Children have to belong somewhere 
and, at least when they are young, to 
someone. There are many hard-to-adopt 
children languishing in foster care. When no 
one can care for a child, it becomes the 
government’s responsibility to do so and to 
make significant choices that will 
profoundly affect the child’s future. At the 
opposite extreme, there are also intense 
fights over child custody, where too many 
people want the same child. Parents (and 
sometimes others involved in the children’s 
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lives) may wage fierce battles over the right 
to live with and raise a given child. When 
the adults cannot agree, it is again the 
government’s responsibility to intervene, 
this time to determine the legal and physical 
custody of the child. The government must 
arbitrate which adults will care for the child 
and where the child will live and spend her 
time. The state must make important, and 
sometimes immutable, choices about the 
child’s future. This decision, made by a 
family court judge, usually reflects the 
judge’s determination of “the best interests 
of the child,” a term that has a distinctly 
paternalistic ring. The decision is actually 
framed, however, in terms of the custody 
rights of the adults, which evokes ancient 
notions of children as property.  
 
In most decisions about child custody, 
for good or ill, biology trumps all other 
emotional and affiliational connections.  
This principle of preferring blood over 
attachment is debatable and transparently 
unhelpful when parents divorce. Each parent 
has an equal biological (or in the case of an 
adoptive parent, legal) claim to the right to 
rear the child. In the majority of cases, the 
parents reach agreement on their own and 
manage to settle issues of custody without 
third-party involvement.2 Only a small 
number of cases go to trial, and fewer still 
are litigated.3 However, when there is no 
agreement, the situation can be explosive.  
The government, then, must decide by 
whom the child will be raised.   
                                                 
2  Eleanor E. Maccoby & Robert H. Mnookin, 
Dividing the Child: Social and Legal Dilemmas of 
Custody (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1992), p. 141.  51% of parents experienced 
negligible conflict and decided issues of custody on 
their own; 24% experienced mild conflict; 10% 
experienced substantial conflict; and 15% intense 
conflict. 
3  Maccoby & Mnookin, p. 103, noting that in 80% of 
the over one thousand cases they studied the parents 
agreed on custody. 
In ancient and early common law, 
children were deemed property, and the 
father automatically possessed custody of 
them.4 In the nineteenth century, notions of 
childhood shifted. Children became less 
important for their contributions as workers 
and childhood was conceived as a time for 
education and nurture, at least for the upper 
classes. The presumption of custody with 
the father yielded to the recognition, 
especially in the “tender years,” of a child’s 
need for maternal care.5 In the United States 
today there is no formal presumption in 
favor of either parent, though many fathers 
still claim that a strong bias exists against 
them. More women have sole custody, but 
this is in part because many men do not seek 
it.6   
 
In contested cases, courts must 
determine not only who will have physical 
custody, but who will have legal custody, 
thereby determining the child’s medical 
care, schooling, and religious upbringing.  
Many states recognize the concept of joint 
legal custody, allowing both parents a say 
regarding education, religion, and other 
long-range child-rearing decisions.  
However, in intensely contested custody 
                                                 
4  Allan Roth, “The Tender Years: Presumption in 
Child Custody Disputes,”  Journal of Family Law 
Quarterly 15 (1977):  423, 425-28,  noting the 
ancient Roman roots of the early common law’s 
vesting custody in the father. 
5 Solangel Maldonado, “Beyond Economic 
Fatherhood:  Encouraging Divorced Fathers to 
Parent,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 153 
(2005): 921, 963. See quotation, “until the mid-
1970’s, child custody law expressly favored mothers, 
entitling them to custody of children of ‘tender years’ 
unless they were unfit.” Roth, “The Tender Years,” 
pp 432-38, noting that even where the law had 
become more egalitarian, courts still favored the 
mother for custody, especially during the tender 
years. Henry H. Foster & Doris J. Freed, “Life with 
Father: 1978,” Family Law Quarterly 11 (1978): 321, 
325-29. 
6 Maccoby & Mnookin, Dividing the Child, p. 99, 
noting only 32.5% of fathers want sole custody. 
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cases, where there is animosity between the 
parents, joint custody is often not a suitable 
option. 
 
Complicating what is already a difficult 
and intrusive decision by government is the 
fact that this very tough decision about a 
child’s future must be made at a time of 
great emotional instability and strife in the 
life of everyone involved.7 Children may 
feel guilt, shock, fear, sadness, loneliness, 
distress, or anger about the dissolution of 
their parents’ marriage.8 It is often a time of 
upheaval and economic uncertainty.  
Children may need extra reassurance that the 
parent who left the marital home still desires 
a continuing relationship.9 Parents are often 
preoccupied by recriminations and regret, 
and suffer a diminished capacity to parent.10  
They are angry, wounded, stressed, anxious, 
depressed and sometimes even temporarily 
crazed—not in good frames of mind for 
making crucial long-term decisions about 
their children’s welfare.11 Although 
divorcing parents feud about material things, 
by far the most excruciating conflicts, public 
and private, legal and informal, occur over 
custody, care, education, and visitation of 
                                                 
7 Lee E. Teitelbaum, “Divorce, Custody, Gender, and 
the Limits of Law:  On Dividing the Child,” 
Michigan Law Review 92 (1994): 1816.  “If there is 
one thing about which virtually everyone interested 
in divorce and custody would agree, it is that this 
process involves, and perhaps creates, the most 
deeply antagonistic relations suffered by humans in 
modern society.” 
8 See Judith S. Wallerstein & Joan B. Kelly, 
Surviving the Breakup (New York: Basic Books, 
1996), pp. 34-95. 
9  Wallerstein & Kelly, p. 48. 
10 Wallerstein & Kelly, p. 36. 
11 Wallerstein & Kelly, pp. 108-131. Joan G. Wexler, 
“Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody 
Decrees,” Yale Law Journal 94 (1985): 757-88. 
“Custody controversies often represent the playing 
out, for a significant period of time after the formal 
divorces, of chronic unresolved and acrimonious 
marital problems.” 
 
the children. Sometimes a parent will seek 
custody as a bargaining ploy, a vindictive 
maneuver, or as an attempt to avoid paying 
child support.  More often, in my 
experience, parents feel a deep emotional 
need and considerable social pressure to 
gain custody of their children.  
 
The process for deciding custody and 
visitation varies somewhat from state to 
state, but rests essentially with an evaluation 
of the best interests of the child. The law in 
my home state of Indiana, for instance, 
mirrors the uniform child custody law, 
delineating various factors for the best-
interests analysis. Relevant factors include: 
the age and sex of the child; the wishes of 
the child (with more consideration given to 
the child’s wishes if the child is at least 
fourteen years old); the interaction and 
interrelationship of the child with his 
parents, siblings and other significant 
people; the child’s adjustment to his home, 
school, and community; and the mental and 
physical health of all individuals involved. 12 
 
Custody evaluation rests ultimately in 
the hands of a family court judge who 
operates without a jury and, except in cases 
of truly preposterous decisions, renders 
judgments that are essentially insulated from 
further review. The trial judge’s factual 
findings are granted great deference and the 
appellate courts will not revisit a ruling 
except in cases of abuse of discretion or 
misapplication of the law.13 Custody cases 
                                                 
12 Indiana Code 31-14-13-2.  There are also other 
factors not relevant to this analysis. 
13 See Leisure v. Wheeler, 828 N.E.2d 409 (Ind. App. 
2005) “In general, we review custody modifications 
for abuse of discretion, with a ‘preference for 
granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in 
family law matters.’” Custody cases generally 
revolve around facts, and rarely present novel issues 
of law.  Therefore, for most cases the judge’s 
determination of the facts and the judge’s application 
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can be reopened and changes can be made, 
but there is a strong bias towards the status 
quo. Alteration of the original determination 
must not only reflect the child’s best 
interests, it must also arise out of a 
substantial change in circumstance.14   
 
Custody determinations necessarily 
implicate deep, sometimes unexplored 
values. The subjective nature of the inquiry 
into what makes a good parent and what 
kind of home is good for children raises 
many interesting ethical as well as 
sociological concerns. Racism, sexism, and 
homophobia inevitably creep into such 
analyses. The history of custody 
determination is replete with ridiculous 
examples of such biases, such as the hippie 
Dad who was denied custody because of his 
lifestyle,15 or the Mom who lost custody 
because she was married to a man of a 
different race.16 More subtly, conscious and 
unconscious cultural biases (such as those of 
middle class imposed on poor people) play a 
role. Judges can easily and inadvertently 
impose their own value systems by, for 
instance, overemphasizing the importance of 
a tidy house or devaluing the danger of 
exposure to domestic violence. Unspoken 
but widespread institutional biases may 
affect the poor who may not “clean up” as 
well for court, who are often unrepresented 
                                                                         
of those facts to the case are a final determination of 
the custody dispute. 
14 A substantial change of circumstance is again a 
matter left primarily to the court’s discretion, but can 
include a parent’s move, the change in relationships 
between parents and an older teen, incarceration, or 
criminal acts by the custodial parent. Sometimes the 
wishes of a child can suffice to qualify as a 
substantial change as the child matures. 
15 Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 
152 (1966) The father was denied custody because of 
his alternative lifestyle and liberal political view as 
compared to grandparent’s Midwest values. 
16 Palmore v. Sidoti, 3 U.S. 429 (1984), reversing the 
divesting of mother’s custody because she remarried 
a black man.  
by counsel, and who because of lack of 
funds, poor transportation, dead-end jobs, 
and no health care, seem less stable and 
dependable.  
 
Guardians Ad Litem in Contested 
Custody Cases 
 
Deciding between two competent 
loving parents can be very difficult. Families 
with the means to do so often pay for 
professional custody evaluations which 
include home visits and a battery of 
psychological evaluations. Where there are 
no funds for such professional evaluators, a 
family court judge will sometimes rely on a 
Guardian Ad Litem (GAL). The GAL is 
charged with investigating the facts outside 
of court and speaking for the best interests 
of the child.  Often the work is performed 
pro bono. Sometimes GALs are social 
workers and sometimes they are lawyers.17    
 
For two years I was such a lawyer.18  
My experience led me to some practical 
ethical insights about the role of custody 
evaluators and some tough questions about 
the ethics of family lawyers generally. The 
actual custody investigation varies 
tremendously, but all competent GALs 
should conduct multiple interviews with the 
parents, caregivers, and children. Medical, 
educational, and day-care records of the 
                                                 
17 The benefit of using lawyers as GALs is that they 
are comfortable in the courtroom and can subpoena 
witnesses and introduce evidence.  As will be noted 
below, there are also some serious liabilities that arise 
from using lawyers.  
18 Until recently, Indiana University Bloomington ran 
a clinic for highly contested custody cases where 
students, under attorney supervision, conducted 
custody investigations as GALs.  Our mandate came 
directly from the local family-court judges, and they 
sent us their more excruciating and contentious cases.  
Our charge was not to represent the children in a 
traditional attorney-client role.  Instead, we advised 
the court as to the best interests of those children. 
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child should be sought. No report would be 
complete without checking the parents’ 
driving and criminal records. Many cases 
require GALs to procure health records, 
including mental health records of the 
parents and anyone who spends significant 
time with the child. Where there is evidence 
of drug addiction, parents may be subject to 
drug or alcohol screens, which can be 
ordered by the court if the parents do not 
consent. In addition, ex-spouses, ex-in-laws, 
grandparents, siblings and others can be 
important sources of information. The 
investigation is thorough, and, obviously, 
wildly intrusive. Parents report feeling 
watched and criticized to the point of not 
feeling natural with their children.19 
 
The GAL “Best Interests” Model versus 
the Traditional Attorney-Client Model 
 
To illustrate briefly what the difference 
might be between the role of lawyer and 
GAL, imagine a fourteen-year-old girl who 
expresses the desire to live with her father 
who works nights, and is not around to 
supervise the girl’s after-school activities.  
The mother and daughter have conflicted 
over issues of the girl’s curfew and the girl’s 
alcohol and marijuana use. A traditional 
attorney representing the girl would 
advocate for custody with the father since 
that is what his client wants. An attorney 
operating as GAL would not be obligated to 
recommend that the court follow the 
teenager’s desires.20 The GAL could 
                                                 
19  Katie Allison Granju, “Losing Custody of My 
Hope,” New York Times Styles Section (Modern 
Love, 5/8/2005).  
20  Andrew I. Schepard, Children, Courts, and 
Custody: Interdisciplinary Models for Divorcing 
Families (New York: Cambridge University Press,  
2004), p. 142. “A Guardian, unlike an Attorney, 
protects rather than empowers the child.  A 
Guardian’s principal allegiance is to the court and not 
to a child client.  A guardian is an investigator and 
reporter, bound to determine and advance the child’s 
determine that even though the fourteen-
year-old doesn’t want the extra supervision, 
it is in her best interests and the GAL would 
therefore recommend custody with the 
mother. 
 
Lawyers and scholars hotly debate how 
children should be represented, whether the 
traditional attorney-client role or the GAL 
best interests role is preferable.21 Even 
accounting for the added complexity of 
differences along the child development 
continuum,22 there is no agreement on the 
best way to represent children in custody 
cases. Some advocate strongly that children 
as young as seven years old should have 
lawyers represent their independent 
interests.23 Those who so advocate base their 
arguments on the autonomy rights of 
children and the role of lawyers as agents.24  
They question the appropriateness of the 
GAL role arguing that a “father knows best 
                                                                         
‘best interests’ even if those interests conflict with 
the child’s preferences.” 
21  There are jurisdictions where the attorneys’ role is 
not so clear-cut, and in New York and New Jersey, 
for instance, the Law Guardians may attempt to play 
dual roles of representatives and protectors. 
22  The power granted to children to direct their own 
lives obviously raises definitional questions.  Few 
would grant such power to four year olds, many to 
children on the cusp of legal majority. 
23  See generally Sarah H. Ramsey, “Representation 
of the Child in Protective Proceedings: The 
Determination of Decision-Making Capacity,” 
Family Law Quarterly 17 (1983): 287. 
24 American Bar Association, “Standard of Practice 
for Lawyers representing Children in Custody 
Cases,” Family Law Quarterly 37 (2003): 129. 
Similarly, in a major conference at Fordham Law 
School conferees concluded that “lawyers serve 
children best when they serve in the role as an 
attorney, not as a guardian ad litem. . . . If the child 
can direct the representation, the lawyer has the same 
ethical obligations as the lawyer would have when 
representing an adult.” “Ethical Issues in the Legal 
Representation of Children,” Fordham Law Review 
64 (1996): 1279, 1294-95. 
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interest” analysis is patriarchal, patronizing, 
and wrong-headed.25   
  
The debate tends to pit legal academics 
(who, like the American Bar Association, 
favor a more traditional attorney-client 
relationship26) against judges and policy 
makers (who tend to favor the GAL role).  
Although there is variation around the 
country, many states such as Indiana do not 
provide children with legal mouthpieces, but 
instead supply them with an adult whose job 
it is zealously to represent children’s best 
interests. The law of custody in Indiana 
gives the child a vote, but not a veto.27 As 
noted above, it considers the child’s wishes 
as a factor, with the child’s wishes becoming 
a more important consideration after the age 
of fourteen. 
 
The policy behind the GAL role rests on 
the belief that cognitively and emotionally, 
children are not little adults, and their best 
interests cannot be ascertained by treating 
them as fully independent, autonomous 
beings.28 This is in part because a child 
                                                 
25  See Peter Margulies, “The Lawyer as Caregiver: 
Child Clients Competence in Context,” Fordham 
Law Review 64 (1996): 1473, 1497, expressing 
concern about lawyers “arrogance and ignorance” in 
advocating for a child’s best interests. 
26  The American Bar Association has developed a set  
of ethical criteria for attorneys.  It distinguishes 
between a child’s attorney, who represents the child 
as any other client would be represented and a “best 
interest attorney,” who serves as an agent of the 
court.  The ABA clearly favors the traditional 
attorney role. See Linda D. Elrod, “Raising the Bar 
for Lawyers who Represent Children: ABA 
Standards of Practice for Custody Cases,” Family 
Law Quarterly 37 (2003): 105, 115. 
27  See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Talking About 
Children’s Rights in Judicial Custody and Visitation 
Decision-Making,” Family Law Quarterly 36 
(2002): 105, 123-25, which advocates a voice-but 
not choice-approach to involving children in 
decisions about custody. 
28  See Melinda G. Schmidt, N. Dickon Reppucci & 
Jennifer L. Woolard, “Effectiveness of Participation 
operates with certain disabilities in thinking 
and maturity compared to adults. 
Consequently, the child’s representative 
may need to advocate against the stated 
wishes of the child in some circumstances.   
 
This debate rests somewhat on 
questions of legal ethics—when, if ever, a 
lawyer should substitute his judgment for 
those of his clients. It also reflects a deep 
and interesting debate about the nature of 
children, their capacity to know their best 
interests, and their rights to influence their 
futures. 
 
The Various Interests in Custody 
Determination 
 
During a year-long multi-disciplinary 
seminar on the “Ethics and Politics of 
Childhood,” a group of scholars with 
backgrounds in history, law, philosophy, and 
education, regularly considered the question 
of children’s autonomy and agency. The 
issue of consulting with and deferring to 
children was a persistent theme. We spent 
much time trying to tease out the intricate 
web of relationships among parents, child 
and state. Contested custody presents a 
wonderful example of all the complexities 
and hidden assumptions behind these 
triangulated relationships. In custody cases, 
the state decides between parents on behalf 
of the child. What are the child’s rights and 
interests once basic needs of food, shelter, 
education, and physical safety have been 
met? I will address that issue after briefly 
mentioning the rights and interests of the 
parents and the state. 
                                                                         
as a Defendant: The Attorney-Juvenile Client 
Relationship,” Behavioral Science & Law 21 (2003): 
175, 177.  See “in general, children under the age of 
15 have significantly poorer understanding of legal 
matters relevant to their participation in trials than do 
adults.”  
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As to parents’ rights, they include free 
expression, religious expression, and 
privacy. A key human right is the 
fundamental right to procreate. That right is 
hollow if, once the child is born, the parents 
are prevented from raising the child and 
transmitting their values. For many people, 
their own liberty interests will be limited if 
they cannot guide their children’s future and 
protect their communities by passing on 
culture and knowledge to their progeny.29  
Relatedly, the ability to pass on religious 
doctrine requires control and influence over 
one’s children. The parents’ religious 
expression may be deeply connected to 
childrearing means and ends. 
 
The state’s interests in custody reflect 
the state’s multiple roles. The state has a 
role as parens patriae, serving to protect 
minors and others who do not possess legal 
competency to protect themselves. The 
government also wants to promote an 
educated citizenry that can participate in and 
perpetuate democracy. The state, in addition 
to protecting children and molding our 
young breed, must protect society from 
children. Its duty to protect the general 
welfare means that the state must make sure 
that unruly children do not threaten safety 
and stability; the state want to prevent their 
child-citizens from growing up to be dangers 
to their fellow citizens life, liberty and 
property. To the extent the state can identify 
involved, functioning parents, it is in its 
interest to do so to avoid footing the bill for 
welfare, foster care, or future jail time.  
Finally, the state has a role as arbiter of civil 
disputes. To keep the peace, and to clarify 
the rights and obligations of everyone 
                                                 
29  Thomas H. Murray, chapter 2, “Families, the 
Marketplace and Values: New Ways of Making 
Babies,” The Worth of a Child (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1996). See page 19, “freedom to 
pursue parenthood is one of the most important 
expressions of individual liberty.” 
involved, the state must provide the parties 
involved with a clear and final accounting of 
their various parental rights and 
responsibilities regarding the children 
involved. 
 
Finally, and most importantly for the 
purposes of this analysis, is the question of 
the child’s rights. At the extremes, there is 
much agreement about the nature of 
children’s rights. Few advocate for allowing 
kids to vote or drink alcohol, and almost 
everyone supports certain claim rights of 
children to food, shelter and freedom from 
physical harm. However, the extent of 
children’s rights to be consulted and perhaps 
even deferred to in making important life 
decisions prompts lively debate. 
 
Feinberg’s Right to an Open Future 
 
I have been particularly struck by the 
work of Joel Feinberg, who identified what 
he called children’s “right to an open 
future.”30 This right is, according to 
Feinberg, “an anticipatory autonomy right” 
or “a right in trust.”31 Feinberg asserts that 
there are areas where the child is not capable 
of making a reasoned choice now, but adult 
decisions will foreclose the availability of 
those rights when the child reaches requisite 
maturity. Feinberg analyzes the conflict that 
occurs when a child’s right-in-trust collides 
with a parent’s rights, and notes that 
community interests are often involved as 
well.32 Although he doesn’t necessarily 
challenge the ultimate result, Feinberg 
criticizes the state’s deference to the 
interests of Amish parents who want to limit 
their children’s education because “[a]n 
                                                 
30  Joel Feinberg, “The Child’s Right to an Open 
Future,” from Whose Child? Children’s Rights, 
Parental Authority, and State Power, edited by 
William Aiken (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 
1980), pp. 124-53.  
31  Feinberg, p. 126. 
32  Feinberg, p. 128. 
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education that renders a child fit for only 
one way of life forecloses irrevocably his 
other options.”33   
 
To resolve the conflict between parents’ 
desire and children’s right-in-trust, Feinberg 
prescribes a method of parenting whereby 
parents get to know their children’s 
strengths and weaknesses, and consciously 
avoid boxing children into a narrow and ill-
fitting future. The hope is that “if the child’s 
future is left open as much as possible for 
his own finished self to determine, the 
fortunate adult that emerges will already 
have achieved, without paradox, a certain 
amount of self fulfillment, a consequence in 
large part of his own already autonomous 
choices in promotion of his own natural 
preferences.”34    
 
Feinberg emphasizes that a child’s right 
to an open future is not necessarily 
determined by consulting the child’s wishes.  
Because of the child’s immaturity, abiding 
by the child’s present desires may actually 
subvert the child’s long-term interest in an 
open future. As Feinberg explains, 
“[r]espect for the child’s future autonomy, 
as an adult, often requires preventing his 
free choice now.”35  
 
Benporath’s Notion of Childhood as an 
Intrinsically Valuable Condition 
 
Much as I am taken with Feinberg’s 
approach, which strikes me as providing a 
coherent organizing principle for talking 
about the rights of children, there is 
something troubling about rights that focus 
almost entirely on the future adult and that 
do not seriously confront present needs and 
wants. It is a mistake to romanticize 
childhood, or to attribute qualities and 
                                                 
33  Feinberg, p. 132. 
34  Feinberg, p. 151. 
35  Feinberg, p. 127. 
abilities to children that they simply do not 
possess. But it is also incomplete to see 
childhood as merely a vehicle to adult 
autonomy, an unfortunate, but necessary 
weigh-station on the road to a full-fledged 
personhood. Sigal Benporath acknowledges 
the limitations of childhood, but argues that 
one need not see this state as inferior to 
adulthood. “A child should be accepted for 
what she is now…childhood must not be 
defined as a passing phase of impaired 
maturity…it should be recognized as a 
unique, yet equally significant part of human 
development.”36 Rather than viewing 
children solely in terms of their present 
deficiencies and their future needs, 
Benporath argues for adult respect for 
children’s condition and adult’s consequent 
obligation toward them.37 I am not 
particularly interested in the distinction she 
draws between children’s rights and adult 
obligations, but I credit Benporath for 
focusing on children as possessing special 
gifts and not just special needs. Benporath 
sees it as the obligation of the family and 
public institutions to acculturate children the 
same way one might welcome a foreigner 
into our country and culture.38 She is much 
more inclined to allow “children to play an 
increasing decisional part in control over 
their lives as they grow and develop.”39 She 
also advocates “making an effort to reveal 
their needs and expressed interests, through 
developmental and other theories as well as 
through listening to children.”40 
 
A clear tension exists between her 
approach and Feinberg’s, but Benporath 
presents a necessary tonic to Feinberg’s 
                                                 
36  Sigal R. Benporath, “Autonomy and Vulnerability: 
On Just Relations between Adults and Children,” 
Journal of Philosophy of Education 37 (2003): 127, 
132-33.  
37  Benporath, p. 137. 
38  Benporath, p. 138. 
39  Benporath, p. 138. 
40  Benporath, p. 138. 
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almost exclusive focus on the citizen-to-be. 
Benporath reminds us that childhood 
possesses the intrinsic value of being, not 
just the process value of becoming.  
 
Applying the Scholarship of Feinberg and 
Benporath to Custody Cases 
 
Feinberg does address child custody; 
however, it is in the context of an unusual 
legal battle between grandparents and a 
biological father. Feinberg uses the case of 
Mark Painter—a notorious example of 
judicial bias—to argue for applying the 
principles of a child’s right to an open future 
in a neutral manner. In that case, the child’s 
mother was dead and the father’s counter-
cultural lifestyle (including “dangerous” 
tendencies toward Buddhism, agnosticism, 
and support of the ACLU) was deemed 
harmful for the child. Feinberg rightfully 
denotes this case as a “horror story”41 and 
argues that the state, except in extreme 
situations, should not remove a child from 
parental custody. 
 
Feinberg observes that “[t]ypically, the 
state must shoulder a greater burden of 
justification for its interferences with parents 
for the sake of their children than that which 
is borne by parents in justification of their 
interferences with children for the children’s 
own sake.”42 This observation, which strikes 
me as true, displays a persistent but unstated 
assumption of Feinberg’s analysis. It 
assumes that, in the state-parent-child 
triangle, the parents operate as a monolith, 
agreeing as to values and the child’s best 
interests. Therefore, Feinberg’s focus on an 
egregious case, in which the mother was 
deceased, is ultimately unhelpful in 
                                                 
41  Feinberg, p. 139. Feinberg argues persuasively 
that “no court has the right to impose its own 
conception of the good life on a child over its natural 
parents’ objections.” 
42   Feinberg, p. 142. 
resolving the more common problems posed 
by custody battles between parents.   
 
Although Feinberg’s theory of relying 
on parents as trustees of the child’s right to 
an open future is confounded by the fact that 
in a contested custody matter, the parents 
cannot agree, Feinberg’s principle of 
maximizing the child’s right to an open 
future nonetheless seems particularly apt. In 
fact, a custody battle seems like a 
quintessential example of a major life choice 
that will affect a child’s ability to exercise 
his autonomy as an adult. In the words of 
Feinberg, “the child’s options in respect to 
life circumstances and character will be 
substantially narrowed well before he is an 
adult.”43 Custody is arguably even more 
vital to a child’s autonomy and ability to 
direct his own future than the educational or 
religious choices that serve as Feinberg’s 
core examples. At least with educational 
choices, under some circumstances, the 
adult can compensate for deficits in his 
childhood education. The choice of who 
raises the child day-to-day will have an even 
more profound effect on the child’s 
personality, life-choices, and ability to 
pursue an open future.   
 
Similarly, Benporath’s work offers 
guidance to a GAL making a custody 
recommendation. First she reminds us of the 
importance of making sure that the person 
inhabiting a world of rights-in-trust is 
having a happy childhood, and that this 
passage of life is to be relished, not merely 
tolerated. Second, she reminds us that the 
world of childhood is valuable and 
sometimes impenetrable to adults, and that 
we may need children to guide us in 
understanding their needs. The contribution 
of Benporath to custody evaluations stems 
from this focus on the happiness of children.  
Children’s sense of wonder, their flexibility 
                                                 
43  Feinberg, p. 146. 
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and their innocence are important attributes 
that the GAL should strive to cherish and 
preserve. In keeping the future open for 
children, we ought to take pains to 
understand their unique needs so that our 
efforts to do not ruin their present. 
 
Both Benporath and Feinberg arguably 
support a best-interests role rather than a 
traditional attorney-client role for the child. 
Feinberg’s open future affirmatively 
anticipates occasions when the child’s 
immediate desires are not consonant with his 
or her long term best interests.  Benporath is 
more focused on the here and now, but she 
seems to see the role of child as translator 
for and educator of adults, not necessarily 
those who make the final decisions about 
major life choices.  
 
Ethical and Practical Concerns about the 
Process of Determining Children’s Best 
Interests in Custody Cases 
 
Concerns about the behavior of GALs 
arise on many levels. As noted above, there 
are serious debates about the best-interests 
role, as opposed to a more traditional 
attorney-client model. Also GALs face the 
difficulty of assessing custody without 
engaging in cultural and other biases.  
Ideally they should focus on the welfare of 
the child and the child’s right to an open 
future while simultaneously protecting and 
promoting a happy childhood. In addition to 
these daunting tasks are two crucial aspects 
of a best-interests analysis that in my 
experience tend to be undervalued by GALs. 
The first concerns the GAL’s duty towards 
the family as a whole. The second concerns 
the importance of respecting the child and 
keeping the child informed and involved 
even if the GAL does not follow the child’s 
wishes. 
 
 
Valuing the Parent-Child Relationship 
GALs often do not place enough weight 
on the parent-child relationship in assessing 
the child’s current happiness and rights-in-
trust. One need not tout parents’ rights to 
make the narrower argument that children’s 
rights cannot be understood without concern 
and respect for parents. As Thomas Murray 
notes “family bonds have an intimacy that 
distinguishes them from other 
attachments.”44 
 
Family law scholars and psychologists 
agree that a child will best develop his 
potential and will make the greatest gains in 
physical and mental health if he has a 
healthy relationship with both parents.  
Numerous studies confirm what life 
experience and common sense already tells 
us, that both parents remain vital to a child’s 
future well-being.45 In a noted study of the 
effect of divorce on children, researchers 
found that children whose parents 
encouraged visitation with the non-custodial 
parent were more psychologically healthy.46  
Regular and meaningful contact with both 
parents led to less stress, better work–
effectiveness, better socialization and less 
                                                 
44  Murray, The Worth of a Child. Similarly 
Ferdinand Schoeman argues that children, at least vis 
a vis their parents, don’t have rights so much as 
“needs, the satisfaction of which involves intimate 
and intense relationship with others.” Ferdinand 
Schoeman, “Rights of Children, Rights of Parents 
and the Moral Basis of the Family,” Ethics 91 (1980):  
6-19; quote, p. 9. Unfortunately Schoeman focuses on 
the power struggle between parents and the state and 
does not consider the situation, such as a divorce 
where parents do not present a united front.  Hence 
his arguments in favor of family privacy and his 
contentions that the state should not intervene absent 
a clear and present danger to the child do not easily 
apply. 
45  See Andrew I. Schepard, The Unfinished Business 
of Modern Court Reform: Reflections on Children, 
Courts and Custody, (2004), p. 21.  
46  See Judith S. Wallerstein & J. Kelly, Surviving the 
Break-Up: How Parents and Children Cope with 
Divorce (New York: Basic Books, 1980), pp. 107-09. 
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aggression.47 Continued contact with the 
non-custodial parent offers emotional 
support, and potentially provides a larger 
support network and greater stimulation, and 
increased opportunities to interact with 
diverse people and stimuli.48     
 
Unfortunately, GALs sometimes behave 
as if the child has little interest—emotional, 
relational, social or practical—in the soon-
to-be defunct family unit. By narrowly 
focusing on the child as individual, rather 
than as a child who is part of a disintegrating 
family, the custody evaluation may 
ultimately ignore some crucial interests of 
the child. GALs sometimes adopt a 
constricted, atomized, autonomy-happy 
version that myopically focuses on the child 
alone. The focus on the child’s interests is 
correct; the definition of those interests is 
too narrow. The GAL doesn’t make the 
mistake of child liberationalists who want to 
impute full rational decision-making to the 
child. Instead, the GAL falls into a related 
error in autonomy-focus thinking. 
 
By undervaluing connection and 
forgetting that meaningful autonomy often 
means cultivating relationships with others, 
GALs may disserve the child practically and 
emotionally. Barring abuse or serious 
neglect, children will be spending time with 
both parents. Wisely, in my opinion, the law 
totally dissociates payment of child support 
from visitation. Even financially deadbeat 
parents, for example, can and should spend 
time with their kids. Although there is 
certainly danger in conflating the interests of 
                                                 
47  See  Schepard, p. 31; Robert D. Hess & Kathleen 
A. Camera, “Post-Divorce Relationships as 
Mediating Factors in the Consequences of Divorce 
for Children,” Journal of Social Issues, 35 (1979): 79. 
48  W. Glenn Clingempeel & N. Dickon Reppucci, 
“Joint Custody After Divorce: Major Issues and 
Goals for Research,” Psychological Bulletin 
91(1982): 107-09.  
 
parents and children, it is impossible and 
undesirable to separate their interests 
entirely. 
 
Respecting the intimacy of the parent-
child relationship and honoring the parents 
themselves is vital to any robust notion of 
the best interests of the child. As Feinberg 
writes, childhood is a passage through which 
children grow into their full rights as 
citizens and must be prepared to exercise 
those rights. A key part of the preparation 
involves guidance from parents. Except in 
the most extreme situations involving abuse 
or neglect, it seems nonsensical to talk about 
the interests of children outside a 
consideration of the parent-child 
relationship.49  
 
Similarly, Benporath’s approach 
requires respect for parents because they are 
the primary, though not exclusive, 
navigators for children through the foreign 
world of adults. At their best, parents 
provide the type of deep appreciation and 
understanding that Benporath sees as 
necessary outgrowths of children’s weak 
position in the world vis-a-vis adults. 
 
In practice, however, GALs are 
sometimes brutal towards parents. Well-
meaning GALs perceive their task as 
ascertaining the best interests of the child, 
and these well-meaning legal pugilists are 
ready to slug it out on behalf of the child.  
Neglecting the child’s need for intimacy, 
support, stability and emotional safety of 
competent, secure parents, GALs sometimes 
act as if their jobs require them to behave 
like Caesar in a gladiator’s duel-to-the-death 
over custody. They exhibit a relentless 
                                                 
49 The exception for abuse, neglect, and violence 
between former spouses is crucial.  Where parents 
have behaved violently or endangered their family, 
the presumption that children benefit from their 
company is no longer necessarily true. 
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attempt to ferret out who is the better parent, 
and then to elevate that individual. As I have 
witnessed it, the “better” parent is 
championed and the “losing” parent is 
ground into the dust, portrayed as unfit and 
sometimes even dangerous to the child. 
These tendencies derive from a desire to 
support the GAL’s assessment of who 
should “win.” However, such an approach 
degrades the ability of the both parents to 
nurture the children and further frays the 
thin bonds of family uniting these feuding 
individuals and their progeny.   
 
Certainly I would not be the first to 
observe that the culture of the adversary 
system is particularly ill-suited to resolving 
family-law disputes.50 We hear all the time 
how divorce lawyers sow discord and 
distrust, making things worse, not only for 
the children, but for the adults. Ironically, 
the GAL, who is supposed to advocate for 
the child and remain outside the role of a 
traditional lawyer, often becomes infected 
by a legal culture of hyper-adversarialism.  
The GAL can shift from being neutral eyes 
and ears of the court into an advocate for 
one of the parties. 
 
This happens because of the 
entrenchment of a legal culture of 
adversarialism. Lawyers are often bound by 
habit, ego and their training as investigators 
and cross-examiners. As GALs, these 
lawyers often fail to understand the deeper 
purpose of their inquiry. Ironically, the very 
skills the lawyers bring to their evaluations 
are what make their participation most 
destructive. Mired in the culture of the 
adversary system, the GAL often advocates 
                                                 
50 See Gregory Firestone & Janet Weinstein, “In the 
Best Interests of Children: A Proposal to Transform 
the Adversarial System,” Fam. Ct. Rev. 4:2 (2004): 
203, 204, arguing that the adversary system 
disempowers and dehumanizes parents.  
 
 
not for the true best interests of the child, in 
having a safe environment, including contact 
with two strong and self-confident parents, 
but for the GAL’s chosen result. GALs may 
feel strongly about their recommendations 
and feel that the best way to insulate their 
preference for one parent is to degrade the 
other parent. They may also over-identify 
with one parent and begin to take the 
decision very personally. By undervaluing 
the parent-child connection and attacking 
the competence, integrity, and judgment of a 
parent, GALs can and often do make things 
worse for parents, and ultimately children. 
 
Taking Children Seriously  
 
Custody decisions for children and early 
adolescents should not be left to them 
despite their obvious stake in the outcome.  
Children or young adolescents are not 
intellectually or emotionally mature enough 
to determine their best interests. I am 
particularly convinced that this is true in 
custody cases. Children of divorcing parents 
are particularly vulnerable to having their 
childhood suddenly brought to an abrupt 
halt. Divorce often thrusts new 
responsibilities on children. The last thing 
they need is the burden of deciding custody.  
As I argue below, however, it is very 
important to take the child’s wishes 
seriously and to let the child teach the GAL 
about his or her needs. 
 
Issues of custody arguably pose more of 
a challenge to Feinberg’s reluctance to let 
the children decide their own interests 
beyond those of education or religion. A 
child might not appreciate or be able to 
meaningfully evaluate his educational 
options, which adults can neutrally assess.  
With child custody, however, the child may 
have some intuition and experience that 
adults cannot access. In determining what 
will maximize their long-term benefit, 
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children may possess some specialized 
expertise on the question of their own 
custody. Their time spent in intimate, 
informal contact with parents give them 
information that no one else can fully 
access. 
 
Both Feinberg and Benporath speak to 
this issue. Though Feinberg rejects a child’s 
right to conclusively determine his own 
rights-in-trust, he definitely sees the child as 
an important participant in the process. He 
observes that “from the beginning the child 
must—inevitably will—have some ‘input’ in 
its own shaping, the extent of which will 
grow continuously even as the child’s 
character itself does.”51 Benporath bases the 
obligations of adults to children in respect 
for the state of childhood and for the child’s 
individuality. She warns that “[n]eglecting 
the present perspectives of children is not 
only disrespectful, and not only results in an 
unjust and myopic society…it also expresses 
a deep disregard for childhood itself.”52 
 
Perhaps because children are so easy to 
dismiss, GALs usually do not make the 
mistake of treating children as clients who 
should call the shots. As I asserted above, 
GALs do fall into adversarial traps, but 
slavishly following the desires of the child 
client is not one of them. In fact, some 
GALs seem to lean toward the other 
extreme, mistakenly concluding that 
children have little to offer and, therefore, 
failing to take their insights and preferences 
seriously. 
 
Practical Solutions for the GAL and the 
Family Court Judge 
 
Practically, the GAL is in a unique role 
to foster the best interests of the child.  
These best interests should be broadly 
                                                 
51  Feinberg, p. 149. 
52  Benporath, p. 140. 
defined. For instance, it is within the court’s 
jurisdiction to order counseling, special 
education, or other support services for the 
child. As part of a custody order, the court 
can also require actions of the parent such as 
attendance at substance-abuse counseling or 
parenting classes. To combat the tendency to 
get overly enmeshed in the adversarial 
nature of the proceedings, GALs should 
deliberately focus on the strengths of both 
parents. Even, or perhaps especially, when 
one parent is the clear custody winner, the 
GAL should think about how to keep the 
non-custodial parent involved in the child’s 
life and confident about his or her parenting 
skills. A parent who emerges from the 
custody evaluation process humiliated and 
feeling terrible about his ability to parent 
will not be able to provide the child comfort 
and security. A child may misread the 
parent’s dejection as rejection. More 
basically, at a time of immense fragility and 
uncertainty, the parent’s confidence will be 
further undermined. All of this combines to 
deprive a child of joy and to limit his future 
options. 
 
This is not to say that GALs should 
ignore or whitewash problems posed by 
parents. Part of a GAL’s job is to make hard 
choices and to deliver tough advice. 
However, a GAL must relay negative 
information or assessments with deep 
respect and compassion for parents. GALs 
must disclose problems honestly, but in the 
least inflammatory and judgmental terms 
possible. A GAL should show the parents 
the report and solicit comments and 
corrections. 
 
These professional obligations do not 
derive from a more basic duty owed to the 
parents or from any sympathy one might 
have for them. They derive from the insight 
that separating the interests of the child from 
the strength and health of the parents relies 
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on a false and cramped view of children’s 
interests. 
 
As a practical matter, GALs should 
never ask a child with whom he prefers to 
live.53 The child, because of his 
developmental stage, the influence of adults, 
and limited maturity and worldview, would 
not necessarily be able to identify his own 
best interests. More importantly, asking the 
child puts him in an impossible position. 
Respecting the child’s emotional needs and 
his attachment to and fear of hurting both 
parents should make GALs circumspect 
about even posing the question. This 
reticence should not be confused with a lack 
of interest in the child’s desires. There are 
many interviewing tricks to learn about the 
child’s wishes and his level of attachment 
and how the child can educate the GAL 
about his or her best interests without 
directly expressing a choice.54 GALs can 
maximize the child’s good relations with 
both parents and minimize any guilt he or 
she might have had expressing his 
preference.   
 
Obviously, there are cases where the 
child directly and vociferously expresses a 
strong preference. It is important that his or 
her views be treated with immense respect. 
The sliding developmental scale used in 
Indiana, where children’s views on custody 
                                                 
53 National Interdisciplinary Colloquium on Child 
Custody, Legal and Mental Health Perspectives on 
Child Custody Law: A Deskbook for Judges, Robert 
J. Levy, ed., 2005. P. 288, opposing asking a child’s 
preference and noting that “asking a child with 
which parent he or she would prefer to live may well 
cause heightened guilt and anxiety. . .and keep the 
child from offering useful information.” 
54 For instance, the child can talk about a typical day 
and respond to questions such as “what would you do 
if you had a bad dream?”  These will elicit revealing 
answers about the child’s relationship with each 
parent without putting the child on the spot. 
 
take higher precedence after age 14, makes 
good sense. 
 
Implications for Lawyers Representing 
Parents 
 
Up to this point, I have argued that 
GALs, in their eagerness to promote the 
child’s best interests, may undervalue the 
child as a resource and fall into adversarial 
behavior, despite the non-adversarial nature 
of their roles. These criticisms of the way 
GALs sometimes behave invite similar 
questions concerning the behavior of 
attorneys representing the parents.  
Attorneys representing parents are by 
definition adversarial and are ethically 
bound to focus on the interests of their 
clients, and not third parties (such as the 
children). They rarely see their job as asking 
questions about the children’s welfare and 
tend to take their cues from their clients, 
who are often in fragile, angry states.   
 
Given the harms inflicted on children 
by dueling parents, it is reasonable to 
wonder whether there is a way to apply the 
lessons of children’s best interests to the role 
of the attorneys for the parents, without 
entirely subverting the traditional attorney’s 
role. May an attorney representing a parent 
even consider the welfare of the children, or 
would such concern for anyone other than 
the client-parent constitute a conflict of 
interest and ethical breach of the duty of 
loyalty?55 I will not in this essay consider 
this immensely important and troubling 
ethical problem. Instead, my focus will 
remain on the interests of the parents 
because I believe that lawyers who represent 
parents should be concerned about the 
                                                 
55 The Lawyers’ rules of professional conduct deem it 
a conflict of interest if a lawyer’s loyalty and 
obligation to a client is materially limited by loyalty 
or obligation to third parties. See, e.g. Ind. R. Pro. 
Conduct 1.7.  
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children as part of their advocacy of parents’ 
interests. 
 
If a child’s long-term future benefit 
relies on meaningful contact with two 
strong, sane parents, and, if, indeed, the 
happiness of children is not easily separated 
from the happiness of parents, then a fuller 
notion of parents’ interests would motivate 
lawyers to think differently about the 
welfare of children. Rather than believing 
that the children’s interests are incidental or 
even in tension with those of the parents, 
lawyers representing the parents could adopt 
and try to communicate to their clients a 
fuller view of the parents’ long-term 
interests. Rather than lumping the kids in 
with the Tupperware as items to be won or 
lost in the divorce settlement, lawyers could 
identify what is truly unique about the 
parent-child relationship and counsel the 
parent to look ahead to their own futures.  
Attorneys should strive beyond satisfying 
the divorcing adults’ perceived current need 
for revenge, vindication, or victory, and 
instead educate the clients about the long-
term interests of the divorcing parents.  
These interests include having a calm 
relationship with the ex-spouse and having 
healthy, happy, well-adjusted children. Just 
as it would be foolish to identify the best 
interests of a child without reference to the 
relationship with the parent, it may be 
equally foolish to represent the parent 
without thinking about how decisions made 
in anger and hurt at the time of divorce and 
initial custody determination will affect the 
web of connections with the children in the 
present and in the future. 
Misunderstood, this approach could 
seem dangerously close to treating adult 
clients like children. Just as children, for 
developmental reasons, cannot be relied 
upon exclusively to identify their own 
interests, so too, divorcing parents, for 
emotional and situational reasons, may be 
poor judges of what they need. One could 
even go so far as argue that many parents in 
the midst of a divorce and custody dispute 
are incapable of making rational 
independent decisions.56 Such an approach 
would be too radical and would clearly 
trample parents’ rights. Yet, for many of the 
wrongs that parents try to address in custody 
cases, the language of rights is inadequate 
and may, when equated with property rights, 
and litigated in the same manner, be harmful 
to all involved, most notably, the parents 
themselves.57   
 
I believe that the solution lies in the 
ability of attorneys to counsel their clients, 
affirmatively raising issues relating to 
children’s long-terms interests. This is not 
only fair to children (who are truly innocent 
third-parties and who pose an ethical 
challenge to the lawyer’s traditional role-
differentiated morality), but vital for parents.  
One hopes that parents get divorced only 
once. Family law attorneys see the same 
squabbles all the time and they note the toll 
it takes on children and the harm that legal 
wrangling does to the finances, hearts, and 
long-term interests of parents.58 If one were 
to counsel clients based on the experience 
and wisdom of seeing many such cases, it is 
clear that the best advice would look to the 
parents’ right to an open future. This open 
                                                 
56  The rules of professional conduct for lawyers 
anticipate the problem of client’s incapacity and 
include a special provision for clients operating under 
a disability that includes requesting that a court 
secure a GAL to represent the client’s best interests.  
This provision (Rule 1.14 of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct) was designed for mentally ill 
or mentally handicapped clients, and not for 
acrimonious divorce cases. 
57  See Murray, The Worth of a Child, noting how the 
in the context of discussing relationships within the 
family “the language of rights seems awkward and 
second best.” 
58 Needless to say any financial interest a lawyer 
might have in prolonging the conflict can never 
ethically influence the lawyer’s advice.    
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future for the parent would entail good 
relations with the ex-spouse, a meaningful 
co-parenting relationship, support with 
childcare, lack of tension at graduations, bar 
mitzvahs and communions, etc., no 
recriminations from children years later for 
having been denied the company of the 
other parent, and most importantly, happier 
and healthier kids. Obviously, an attorney 
cannot commandeer the process and set the 
goals of the representation, but an attorney 
can educate the client about how the 
parents’ current interests and desires may 
conflict with his long term rights and 
interests as a parent. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For GALs representing children in 
contested custody cases, it is vital to avoid 
being seduced by the dark side of the 
adversary system, and instead maintain a 
commitment to ensuring, wherever possible, 
the health and stability of both parents. This 
is not just for reasons of decency, but 
because the child’s right to an open future 
depends on having strong, sane parents.  
Furthermore, in determining the child’s best 
interests, the GAL should take the child’s 
stated wishes very seriously, but should not 
feel bound by them, and should not directly 
pose to the child the question of which 
parent should have custody. 
 
There are strong reasons why parents 
deserve respect in their own right and why 
the intimacy of their relationships with their 
children must be respected. In this article, 
however, I have attempted to craft a 
respectful approach to parent’s rights, 
interests, and personhood that derives not 
from the parents themselves, but from the 
needs of their children. This approach 
indicates that a good lawyer should counsel 
his or her clients about the needs of the 
children because those needs will affect the 
parents’ rights-in-trust. 
Both sets of arguments, about GALs 
and regular attorneys, rest on the notion that 
it is impossible entirely to separate the 
interests of parents and children. Although 
those interests may not be identical, and may 
in fact conflict at times, they are inextricably 
bound; it is meaningless to talk about the 
best interests of the child without 
considering the happiness of the parents, and 
it is equally pointless to talk about the 
interests of the parent without considering 
the long term effects on the children. 
 
 
